By Xiaoxin Jing, Dongmo Zhang, Xudong Luo (auth.), Stephen Cranefield, Abhaya Nayak (eds.)

This booklet constitutes the refereed lawsuits of the twenty sixth Australasian Joint convention on man made Intelligence, AI 2013, held in Dunedin, New Zealand, in December 2013. The 35 revised complete papers and 19 revised brief papers awarded have been conscientiously reviewed and chosen from a hundred and twenty submissions. The papers are equipped in topical sections as brokers; AI functions; cognitive modelling; computing device imaginative and prescient; constraint delight, seek and optimisation; evolutionary computation; online game enjoying; wisdom illustration and reasoning; computing device studying and information mining; usual language processing and data retrieval; making plans and scheduling.

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Additional resources for AI 2013: Advances in Artificial Intelligence: 26th Australasian Joint Conference, Dunedin, New Zealand, December 1-6, 2013. Proceedings

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So, to Security Games with Ambiguous Information about Attacker Types 19 implement his maximised payoff, he should ensure that the defender selects that strategy by maximising the defender’s payoff. Similarly, given the attacker’s strategy, if the defender has two indifferent mixed strategies, the defender should consider the attacker’s preference ordering for the strategies based on his belief about the attacker’s types. Definition 7. In ambiguous security game (N, Ta , md , S, X, U ), the attacker’s total preference degree over mixed strategy Xi is defined as: ρa (Xi ) = 2E a (Xi )+(1−δ(md ))(E a (Xi )−E a (Xi )) , 2 (12) where δ(md ) is the ambiguity degree of mass function md and min{Ua (Xi , s∗a (t, Xi ), t) | t ∈ τ }md (τ ), E a (Xi ) = τ ⊆Ta E a (Xi ) = ∗ τ ⊆Ta max{Ua (Xi , sa (t, Xi ), t) | t ∈ τ }md (τ ), (13) (14) where Ua (Xi , s∗a (t), t) is calculated by formula (10).

When the seller, agent 1, makes one concession more than the buyer, the surplus division is (δ1 , 1 − δ1 ) and when the buyer makes one concession more than the seller, the surplus division is (1 − δ2 , δ2 ). – σ1 = al2 − al1 is the surplus obtainable when the seller plays soft (P S) and the buyer plays tough (P T ). – σ2 = ah2 − ah1 is the surplus obtainable when the seller plays tough (P T ) and the buyer plays soft (P S). – σ3 = ah2 − al2 is the surplus obtainable when both agents play P S. – γ = ah1 − al2 is the gap between the valuations of the strong-type agents.

Then, all NP-complete problems, which can be reduced to Bayesian Stackelberg games with two players to find the optimal mixed strategy, can also be reduced to security games with ambiguous attacker types to find the optimal mixed strategy. So, in security games with ambiguous attacker types, it is NP-hard to find an optimal mixed strategy to commit to. 4 Evaluation In this section, we are going to evaluate our model by lots of experiments. In the field of security games [1, 4, 5], most investigations could not handle the ambiguous information.

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